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Abstract 
In a typical IPO game with first-price auctions, we argue that risk-averse investors always 
underbid in equilibrium because of subjective interpretations of the firm’ communication  
about its actual value and resulting risk aversion about the likelihood of facing investors 
with higher valuations. We show that the noisier the investors’ inferences of the firm’ 
value (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) the higher the underbidding level. 
Our finding is independent of winner’s curse effects and possible irrationality, and allows 
for a testable theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Underpricing is a common feature of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Two main 
explanations have been given so far. The first explanation stems from a winner’s curse 
effect to compensate uninformed traders for receiving large fractions of overpriced shares 
(Rock, 86); the second argues that ‘sentiment’ or irrational traders may distort prices 
downward (Cornelli et al. (04) and Leite, 05). 
 
We present a new explanation to underpricing based on the analysis of market 
microstructure of IPO issuance, in particular on the analysis of issuance through the most 
common first-price auctions (Kandel et al. (99), see also Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (02) 
for other types). We argue that, in a typical IPO game with such auctions, the noisier the 
inferences of CARA investors about the firm’ value (in the sense of first-order stochastic 
dominance) from the pre-issuance communication effort of the firm, the higher the 
underbidding level. Moreover, we show that this phenomena is independent of winner’s 
curse effects, private information and investors’ irrationality as typically argued. 
 
 
 
 
 
We show that CARA investors always underbid in equilibrium because of subjective 
interpretations of the firm’ communication  about its actual value and resulting risk 
aversion about the likelihood of facing investors with higher valuations. Thus 
underpricing stems from both risk aversion and firm’ communication effectiveness. 
 
Our ranking of underpicing level in terms of first-order stochastic dominance allows for a 
testable theory. In contrast, similar results would not obtain with, say, less common 
second-price auctions or with risk-neutral agents (see Maskin and Riley, 84). 
  
2. The model 
 
The model has three dates. There is one firm and n>1 rational investors. The value of the 
firm is ],[0 θθθ ∈ , this value is private information to the firm.  
 
At t=0, the firm starts an IPO in the form of a first-price auction. As in Leite 
(2005), we make the common albeit simplifying assumption that one share only is offered 
to the investors. The firm sends a public signal to the investors about 0θ . The following is 
common knowledge: 1) every investor i believes that ],[ θθθ ∈i  is the actual value of the 
firm, drawn from a random variable with twice-differentiable cumulative distribution 
0θG (this subjective valuation can be through reputation effect or private and partial 
information for instance), 2) every agent assumes that her signal is accurate, 3) beliefs are 
independent.  At t=1, the highest bidder pays her bid and receives her share. The true 
value of the firm then becomes public knowledge. At t=2, the share can be retraded to 
other investors by the winner. 
 
 This timing avoids for the winner the issue of reselling the share to other investors 
with private values. The resale value would then depend on others’ signals, leading to a 
common-value auction. A similar result holds in the latter case but the analysis is more 
cumbersome; moreover, a private-value setting rules out winner’s curse effects. 
 
 Given our timing, and conditional on winning with a bid 0≥b  and having a 
signal θ, the monetary gain at t=1 is .b−θ  Every agent has a CARA utility function over 
such monetary gains if winning (normalized so that u(0)=0), and receives 0 if loosing. A 
strategy for a player is a bid function +ℜ→],[: θθb .  Define now the random variable 
    x}{|  =r(x) maxmax ≤θθ where maxθ is the highest valuation from all the other players, for 
every player by symmetry.   
 
Theorem:  Let r and r be two random variables as above  such that r first-order 
stochastically dominates r ,  with respective symmetric equilibrium strategies b and .b  
For every ],,[ θθθ ∈  we have that ).()( θθθ bb ≥≥  
 
The above theorem can be interpreted as follows: as signals or individual interpretations 
about the firm value become more accurate in the sense of first-order stochastic 
dominance, which in turn reduces in the same sense the probability of facing investors 
with higher valuations, investors underbid less.     
 Proof: We proceed by first deriving a closed-form solution to the game, and the result 
then obtains by standard arguments in stochastic dominance. Define first )()( 1 θθ −= nGF  
for every ].,[ θθθ ∈  
 
Existence and differentiability of a symmetric equilibrium strategy b(.) follows 
from an argument similar to that in Th. 2 in Maskin and Riley (84). Consider the problem 
of, say, Investor 1 when all the other investors play according to b(.). Her bidding 
strategy b(.) must satisfy for every ],[ θθθ ∈   
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Differentiating the objective function in Eq. (1) and using optimality conditions leads to 
the differential equation 
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with the boundary condition θθ =)(b since an investor with this signal has a zero 
probability of winning the auction and thus bids at her lowest level. Define now, for 
every ],,[ θθ∈x  the certainty equivalent CE(x) to solve 
 
(3)  ],|)([))(( xyyxuExCExu y ≤−=− )))   
 
where y) is the maximum of the signals received by all the investors but Investor 1. Since 
u(.) is CARA, CE(.) does not depend on the wealth and thus Eq. (3) rewrites as 
 
(4)  ]|)([))(( xyyuExCEu y ≤−=− ))) θθ  for every θ. 
 
Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to x, using the property of the derivatives of u(.), 
recalling that u(0)=0 and rearranging yields the differential equation 
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It is also straightforward to check from Eq. (4) that ,)( θθ =CE  thus the systems 
described in Eq. (2) and Eq. (5) have the same initial conditions. We thus have that 
b(.)=CE(.), which in particular proves the first inequality in the Theorem. 
 
 For some true value 0θ , consider now the signal interpretations 0θr  and 0θr  such 
that 
0θr   FSD  0θr  with respective symmetric equilibrium strategies b and .b  Applying 
the definition stochastic dominance to the certainty equivalent in Eq. (4) yields the 
desired inequality. The proof is now complete. ▄ 
  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
We have developed a market microstructure explanation of IPOs underpricing, based on 
bidding behavior of investors with subjective valuations stemming from firm’ 
communication. The originality of our work is that equilibrium underpricing is not driven 
by winner’s curse issues, but rather by interpretation of the firm’ communication  and 
resulting risk aversion about the likelihood of facing investors with higher valuations. 
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